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1Efficiency Wage and Endogenous Job Destruction in the DMP Model----- an
Extension
Titas Kumar Bandopadhyay
Abstract: This paper introduces efficiency wage relation and assumes endogenous job
destruction in the benchmark DMP model. A comparative static analysis has also been
made which shows that most of the results obtained in the DMP model get altered in the
extended model.
JEL Code: F 32.
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Introduction: The path-breaking work in the labour market is the DMP model. This
model provides a useful framework where different labour market policies can be
analyzed in the presence of matching friction. In the benchmark model of DMP we find
that a positive productivity shock raises Nash wage rate and the market tightness but
reduces unemployment rate. A high discount rate reduces both the wage rate and the
market tightness but raises the equilibrium rate of unemployment. An increase in the
unemployment benefit and / worker’s bargaining power raises both wage rate and
unemployment rate and lower market tightness. In the DMP model we also find that
paradox appears if the worker’s bargaining power vanishes. This is usually known as the
Diamond Paradox.
The existing literature shows that the DMP model has been extended by introducing
cyclicality, endogenous job destruction and efficiency wage relation. These includes the
works of Albrechet et al. (1984), Cole and Rogerson (1989), Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994), Abraham et al. (1995), Zenou and Smith (1995), Andolfatto (1996), Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2005), Shimmer(2005), Zenou (2005), Arozamena and Ceneteno
(2007), Elsby et al. (2007), Pissarides(2007) etc. The efficiency wage adjusted extension
2of the DMP model considers Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) type efficiency wage relation
where worker’s efficiency depends on the wage paid to the worker.
In this paper we introduce efficiency wage relation in the DMP model where worker’s
efficiency depends on the wage rate and the market tightness. We also assume that higher
efficiency implies lower job destruction rate and so job destruction is endogenized
through the worker’s efficiency. We examine the parametric effects on the nash-wage
rate, market tightness and on the unemployment rate at steady state equilibrium. In most
cases we observe that the results obtained in benchmark model of DMP are changed
under the Solow elasticity condition. Further, if the worker’s bargaining power is nil the
so-called Diamond paradox can be solved if worker’s efficiency is greater than one. In
this special case market tightness does not respond to changes in parameters.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe the model. Section 3
embraces the comparative static exercises. Section 4 throws light on the Diamond
paradox and section 5 concludes.
2 The Model:
We introduce efficiency wage relation in the benchmark DMP model. We assume that
worker’s efficiency ( h ) depends on the wage rate ( w ) and the market tightness ( ).
Thus the efficiency function of the worker is
( , )h h w                                                                                                                          (1)
Where , 0;  , 0;  0.w ww w wh h h h h h      
We assume that the job destruction rate ( ) is endogenous and is inversely associated
with the worker’s efficiency.1 Thus, we may write
1 We find a strong negative relation between wage rate and separation rate in the works of
Leonard (1987), Anderson and Meyer (1994), Galizzy and Lang (1998) and Christensen et al.
(2005). Capelli and Chauvin (1991).
3  , 0.h                                            (2)
The Bellman equations for unemployment (U ), employment (W ), vacancy ( C ) and jobs
filled in ( J ) are
  rU b q W U                                  (3)
    ,
w
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  rV C q J V                                  (5)
   ,
w




    (6)
r  is the discount rate, b is the unemployment benefit, C is the cost of maintaining
vacancy, y is the constant match productivity and q is the job offer rate.
A firm creates jobs up to the point where 0.V   Using this condition from (5) and (6)








      
(7)
This is the zero-profit condition of a Firm since value of job is exactly matched by the
wage cost plus rental cost plus recruitment cost of labour.
Following DMP we also assume Nash-wage equation which can be derived from the
following exercise:
   
 
1
.Max W U J V
w
     (8)
where  is the bargaining strength of the worker and 1 0 
Assuming interior solutions exist the first order conditions are2
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      (9)
The unemployment rate at steady state is
 







Now, using (7) and (9) we get equilibrium steady state values of ,w  . Then, we get
,h  from (1) and (2). Finally, u can be obtained from Equation (10).
3. Comparative Static Effects:
Taking total differentials of Equations (7), (9) and (10) and using (1), (2), (12) and the
Solow elasticity condition one can get3
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                         
                                                                   (11)
The above results lead to the following propositions:
Proposition1: Under the Solow elasticity condition, a positive productivity shock
dampens Nash wage rate and market tightness but raises unemployment rate.
3 See Appendix B and C.
5However, in the benchmark DMP model we get the opposite results where worker’s
efficiency was not considered.
Proposition 2: In the presence of efficiency wage relation a high discount rate raises both
the wage rate and the market tightness but lower unemployment rate if Solow elasticity
condition holds.
In the benchmark DMP model where worker’s efficiency was absent we get absolutely
different results.
Proposition 3: In the presence of efficiency wage relation and the Solow elasticity
condition an increase in the unemployment benefit raises Nash wage rate but lowers both
market tightness and unemployment rate under some reasonable condition. The same
outcomes are obtained if worker’s bargaining power improves.
However, in the benchmark DMP model without efficiency wage relation the parametric
effects of unemployment benefits and worker’s bargaining power on unemployment rate
are different.
4. The DMP Paradox:
Now, we assume that 0.   In this case,   .,
w b
h w 
 If 1,  .h w b   In this situation, a
worker can get b  if he remains unemployed but if he is employed he gets w which is less
than b . So, he has no incentive to search jobs and this leads to Diamond paradox.
However, if 1,h w b  and so Diamond paradox does not arise here. Thus, the
efficiency wage relation can resolve the Diamond Paradox if 1.h 
6We now examine the comparative static results if 0.   From Equations (7), (9) and
(10) and using 1, 0
,
eh w    we get
4
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ˆ ˆ ˆ
0, 0, 0;ˆˆ ˆ















               
                                                 (12)
From (12) it is evident that if 0   market tightness does not respond to changes in , .y r
5. Conclusions:
In this paper we extend the DMP model by incorporating efficiency wage relation in the
benchmark DMP model. We also assume endogenous job destruction where it is
inversely associated to the worker’s efficiency. The presence of wage efficiency relation
modifies the basic equations of the original DMP model. These changes are also reflected
in the comparative static results. In most cases, the parametric effects on the wage rate,
market tightness and the equilibrium rate of unemployment are opposite to those usually
obtained in the benchmark DMP model.
Further, we also find that even if 0  , the Diamond Paradox can be resolved if 1.h   In
this case market tightness is purely passive to changes in match productivity and discount
rate.
4 See Appendix B and C.
7Appendix A: Derivation of Nash bargaining solutions
The Nash –bargaining problem is
    1Max W U J V
w
    
                                                                               (A.1)
The first order condition for maximization is
        1 0
2 2
J V W U W U J V
w w
 
                                                   (A.2)
Using (4), (6) and the zero-profit condition 0V   into (A.2) one gets
 
      
1
, 1 0





      
or
       1 1 0, ,we b y C rkh w h w                                                                (A.3)
Appendix B: Effects of changes in , , ,y r b   on ,w  :
Total Differentials of Equations (7) and (9) yields
   
 
ˆˆ1 . . .
, , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ
w w
e e e J w e e J r Jeh w h h w h h qh h
yy J k rr
      
                
  
       (A.4)
    ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 1
, ,
w w w
e w e C bb b yy rkrh w hh h h
      
                                   (A.5)
Using Cramer’s rule from (A.4) and (A.5) we get
8   
  




w wbb b yy rkr e e J r Jeh h qh h
w
wyy J k rr e Chh
       
 
                                    
   (A.6)
   
    
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1 1 . .
, , ,1ˆ
ˆ ˆ
                            1
,
w wbb b yy rkr e e e Jh w h h wh h
wyy J k rr eh wh
    

                            
     (A.7)
where
   
 
1 .
, , , ,
                         1 . .
, , , ,
w w
e e e J r Jeh w h h qh h
w w
e C e e e Jh h w h h wh h
   
   
            
        
                               (A.8)
Under the Solow elasticity condition,




e C e Jh hh
   
       
 
        (A.8.1)
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   
                                                                             (A.9)
From (A.6) and (A.7) we get
 .
, , ,ˆ 0
ˆ
,
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, ,
w
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 
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, , , 0ˆ
w
e e J r Jebw h h qh
b
    
             
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ww
e e J r Jebw h h qhh
   

                     
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 
                                                                                             (A.7.2)
 
   
ˆ 1
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                                                                                    (A.7.4)
Appendix C: Effects of changes in , , ,y r b   on u :
Total differentials of Equation (10) give
    ˆˆ ˆ1 . 1 . 1
, , , , ,
u u e e w u e e eh h w h h q    
                                                  (A.10)
     
ˆ 1
. . 0ˆ ,
w b e Jhh


      
  
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Using (A.6.1) - (A.7.4) from (A.10) we get
   
         
ˆˆ ˆ
1 1 . 1 0
, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ
u w
u e u e e eh h h qy y y

   
                           
     (A.9.1)
   
         
ˆˆ ˆ
1 1 . 1 0
, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ
u w
u e u e e eh h h qr r r

   
                           
     (A.9.2)
   
         
ˆˆ ˆ ,1 1 . 1 0 iffˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,
,
J requ w w
u e u e e eh h h q h eb b b h
 
   

                                
    
(A.9.3)
   
         
ˆˆ ˆ ,1 1 . 1 0 iffˆ ˆ ˆ, , , ,
,
J requ w w
u e u e e eh h h q h eh
 
      
                                
    
 (A.9.4)
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